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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

A HARDER “HARD CASE”

DOUG WILLIAMS*
INTRODUCTION
In 1975, the Department of the Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service, with
little fanfare, promulgated a simple rule under the Endangered Species Act of
1973 (ESA). The rule provided that that the ESA’s prohibition against the
“taking” of any endangered species includes “significant environmental
modification or degradation” that “actually injures or kills” a protected
species.1 Twenty years later, in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to
the rule, concluding that the agency had acted reasonably.2 In Nino’s
Nightmare: Legal Process Theory as a Jurisprudence of Toggling Between
Facts and Norms, Professor Eskridge considers Sweet Home to be a “hard
case.”3 It is hard from the perspectives of the major schools of
“legisprudence”: positivism, Dworkinian “normativism,” and “legal process
purposivism.” And yet, in Professor Eskridge’s view, none of the Justices
candidly acknowledged as much. In determining whether the Department of
the Interior (DOI) may properly interpret the Endangered Species Act to
include as a prohibited “taking” of listed endangered species some forms of
habitat modification on privately-owned land, the Justices apparently faked
everyone out. The majority and dissenting opinions of Justices Stevens and
Scalia, respectively, both treated “conventional legal sources” as entirely
adequate to resolve the issue.4
From a positivist’s perspective, Professor Eskridge contends that Sweet
Home is a hard case because “the law runs out . . . and judges then fill gaps in
the law with policy judgments.”5 He argues that, for Justice Stevens, a “green

* Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. I want to thank Joel Goldstein and the staff of
the Saint Louis University Law Journal for inviting me to participate in the Childress Lecture
program. Thanks also to my fellow participants, especially Bill Eskridge, for their stimulating and
insightful work.
1. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1975).
2. 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995).
3. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Nino’s Nightmare: Legal Process Theory as a Jurisprudence of
Toggling Between Facts and Norms, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 865, 892–93 (2013).
4. Id. at 884 n.84.
5. Id. at 882–83.
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property norm” provided the unstated, but appropriate normative framework.6
By contrast, Justice Scalia’s dissent can be understood as the product of the
Justice’s (un- or under-stated) commitment to “a Blackstonian preference for
highly limited government.”7 These norms, the real drivers of the respective
Justices’ positions, remained “closeted” and unexamined.8
So, would the resolution of the case have become clearer if the Justices had
approached the interpretive problem from a Dworkinian, “law as integrity”
perspective, in which norms are placed on public display and openly debated?
Not even close. Professor Eskridge argues that had the closeted norms been
brought out into the open, the case would remain a hard one, perhaps even
harder, because there is no widespread consensus on which of the various
normative, general theories best accords with the nation’s political traditions,9
or indeed, whether the “community of principle” undergirding Dworkin’s
approach is itself a normatively desirable ideal.10
In the face of this seeming intractability, Professor Eskridge then turns to
“legal process purposivism” as a potential pathway through this incredible
thicket. Under this approach, which is instrumental and institutional in
orientation, Professor Eskridge concludes that it might have been sufficient for
the Justices simply to acknowledge that “[a]gencies chock full of expertise and
more accountable to the political process and democratically elected officials
are the primary interpreters in our republic of statutes, and the complicated
purposive analysis required by legal process legisprudence can better be
carried out by agencies than by judges.”11 Yet, even on this point, with its
potential to blaze a middle way through otherwise insuperable theoretical
thickets, there is a troubling obstacle—namely, “the amount of trust our legal
system should be lodging in the Department of Interior to carry out the
requirements of the [ESA] in a practical and purposive way.”12 Again,
however, neither Justice Stevens nor Justice Scalia stood up to that issue in
Sweet Home. But what if they did? Are there obvious or analytically sound
criteria that a judge might use in answering the “trust” question? If there are
such criteria, they remain mysteriously hidden from view. It seems, alas, that
there is no satisfying way for cases like Sweet Home to be resolved.
In this Article, I want to challenge that conclusion and voice strong (but
not complete) support for Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court. But I will first
raise some questions about important aspects of Sweet Home that I believe

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 882.
Id. at 881.
Id. at 884.
Eskridge, supra note 3, at 888–90.
Id. at 889–92.
Id. at 904.
Id. at 905.
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were also “closeted” by the Court. I will make two arguments. First, I will
argue, in agreement with Professor Eskridge, that Sweet Home was, indeed, a
“hard case,” perhaps even harder than Professor Eskridge suggests. My
argument, however, comes from a more conventional, doctrinal perspective.
The central focus of this argument is on the Sweet Home Court’s application of
the rule of deference to agency interpretations of law as articulated in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.13
Although Professor Eskridge mentions Chevron in passing, he gives scant
attention to its application in Sweet Home. This is a bit curious given the place
of prominence Chevron has secured in the practicing bars, as well as the
courts’ ways of framing legal issues in cases like Sweet Home.14 Viewed
through Chevron’s framework, Sweet Home seems to be an easy case. The
statute, if it does not fully support the DOI’s interpretation, is at least
ambiguous on the “harm” question. So, under Chevron, the Court must defer to
the DOI’s interpretation unless it is simply unreasonable.
But here’s the rub against this just-so story: there is a substantial question
about whether the Chevron framework should apply at all in Sweet Home. This
is what has become known as the “Chevron Step Zero” problem,15 which the
Court most prominently addressed in United States v. Mead Corp.16 In Mead,
the Court limited the application of Chevron to those instances in which it is
apparent that Congress vested the agency with the authority “to speak with the
force of law.”17 This key question was neither asked nor answered by the Court
in Sweet Home.
The Chevron Step Zero problem in Sweet Home is based on two themes
that stand in the way of a straightforward application of Chevron’s rule of
deference. First, in some cases, the courts have concluded that agency
interpretations raising “major” or “fundamental” issues about the compass of a
statutory program are not entitled to Chevron deference, at least not unless
Congress has expressly given the agency the authority to resolve such

13. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
14. For reviews of Chevron’s prominence, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron:
The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 399 (Peter L. Strauss
ed., 2006); Orrin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron
Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1998); Peter H. Schuck & E.
Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990
DUKE L.J. 984.
15. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833,
836 (2001) (describing “step zero” in the Chevron doctrine as “the inquiry that must be made in
deciding whether courts should turn to the Chevron framework at all”); Cass R. Sunstein,
Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006) (describing “Chevron Step Zero” as “the initial
inquiry into whether the Chevron framework applies at all”).
16. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
17. Id. at 229.
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questions.18 In my view, Sweet Home raises a fundamental issue in the
administration of the ESA, though one must range considerably from the
Court’s description of the issue to fully appreciate the significance of the
DOI’s harm rule. If the “major issues” exception to Chevron is, in fact,
governing law, then a strong argument can be made that the Court was
obligated to decide for itself whether the harm rule is mandated by the ESA,
not just a “policy” choice open to the DOI in the face of statutory ambiguity.
The second theme of the Chevron Step Zero problem in Sweet Home
involves what is known as the “avoidance canon.” In brief, this aid in statutory
interpretation directs courts to prefer an interpretation of a statute that avoids
serious constitutional questions over interpretations that push the limits of
constitutional authority.19 In the Chevron Step Zero context, the canon
counsels that Chevron deference be withheld when an otherwise ambiguous
statute is interpreted by an agency in a way that approaches constitutional
limitations.20 The expanded footprint of the ESA brought about by the harm
rule pushes federal regulatory power perilously close to constitutional limits, as
subsequent decisions by the courts of appeals have confirmed.21 This, too,
makes the majority’s reliance on Chevron considerably more controversial.
My second argument, presented in Part II, pertains to the problem with
which Professor Eskridge is primarily concerned: the “closeting” of decisional
criteria—such as norms—on the part of the Justices in Sweet Home. In this
respect, however, I am not concerned with the closeting of the sort of things
with which Professor Eskridge is concerned; instead, I return to the Chevron
argument and consider why the Court never raised the Chevron Step Zero
problem. I conclude that the Court was correct to apply Chevron. The principal
reason is that the Court’s decision in Sweet Home reflects both the limitations
on the Court’s own understanding of the implications of its decision and a
willingness to permit a relatively nascent regulatory program to define itself
more clearly. In these respects, the case shares many of the characteristics of
the situation in Chevron itself.
Nonetheless, I believe Sweet Home is a hard case because it provides
strong hints that the Court may have made a simple, but understandable,
category mistake in Chevron itself. That mistake was to regard the rule under
review as an exercise of “statutory interpretation,” rather than as an act of
policymaking pursuant to delegated statutory authority.22 While the agency

18. Sunstein, supra note 15, at 193.
19. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 15, at 914–15.
20. Id.
21. See infra notes 104–12 and accompanying text.
22. For an extended argument that Chevron confuses “statutory interpretation” with “public
administration,” see Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How
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actions in both Chevron and Sweet Home undoubtedly involve some element
of statutory interpretation, in neither case was “interpretation” the primary
purpose of the agency’s decision, nor were the factors driving the agency’s
policymaking the kind of factors one would ordinarily consider to be
interpretive methodologies. To borrow Professor Herz’s terminology, in both
cases the agencies were engaged in “lawmaking,” not in legal interpretation.23
Viewed from this perspective, the application of Chevron in Sweet Home
emphasizes the incidental character of the agency’s statutory interpretation in
the larger policymaking process that yielded the harm rule. The unstated
message the Court may have sent is, therefore, quite different from the closeted
norms discussed by Professor Eskridge. We might plausibly view Justice
Stevens’s opinion for the Court not as premised on an embrace of a “green
property norm,” but, rather, as an acknowledgement of the absence of any
reliable norm to which one might appeal in assessing the legality of the
agency’s exercise of lawmaking. In those circumstances, it may be that the
Court was willing to permit the DOI to experiment with ways to make the ESA
both meaningful and workable by accommodating conflicting norms as it
implemented and refined the application of the harm rule—in other words, to
administer a statutory program through an iterative process of policymaking. A
contrary conclusion would disrupt the ongoing process of creating legal
meaning, or “lawmaking”—what Robert Cover has called “jurisgenesis”24—
and disrupt that process in ways that do violence to the possibility of building
cooperation and shared commitments among persons and institutions with
otherwise incompatible worldviews. If there is a “closeted norm” at work in
Sweet Home, it is at least one that Chevron embraces: a modest judicial rule in
overseeing the complex and policy-laden judgments of administrative agencies
in which Congress has invested its trust.
I. A HARDER HARD CASE, CONVENTIONALLY SPEAKING
The majority in Sweet Home ultimately based its judgment on the rule of
deference to agency interpretations of law, as established in Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.25 In Chevron, the Court
concluded that when an agency’s interpretation of a statute that the agency
administers is challenged, the reviewing court must first ascertain “whether

Chevron Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673
(2007).
23. See Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking
Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187 (1992).
24. See Robert M. Cover, Foreward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11 (1983)
(describing “jurisgenesis” as “the creation of legal meaning”).
25. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”26 If so, then
Congress’s decision must be respected, regardless of a different agency
interpretation and whatever reasons the agency offers in support of it. This
initial inquiry has become known as Chevron Step One. But, “if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” then the Court proceeds
to Chevron Step Two, in which “the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”27 The
“permissibility” of an agency construction of a statutory provision is based on
a rule of strong deference to the agency, reflecting the Court’s conclusion that
a statutory “gap,” or ambiguity, should (at least sometimes) be viewed as an
implicit delegation of authority from Congress to the agency to resolve the
statutory ambiguity. The strength of that deference is particularly robust when
the gap to be filled concerns issues of “policy.” Indeed, in Chevron, the Court
concluded that “[w]hen a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory
provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s
policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by
Congress, the challenge must fail.”28
In Sweet Home, Justice Stevens concluded that “Congress did not
unambiguously manifest its intent to adopt [the challengers’ interpretation of
the statute] and that the Secretary’s interpretation is reasonable . . . .”29 Under
Chevron, the Court concluded, these two conclusions “suffice” to decide the
case in favor of the DOI.30
To be sure, as Professor Eskridge suggests, Justice Stevens’s opinion in
Sweet Home may be read to provide a different, stronger basis for supporting
the DOI’s harm rule—i.e., that it was the uniquely correct interpretation of the
ESA’s definition of “harm,” and thus, was “hardwired into the statute.”31
Nonetheless, the Court rather clearly stopped short of concluding that Congress
had addressed the “precise question at issue,” preferring the conclusion that the
DOI’s rule was not foreclosed by the statute.32 Moreover, at every key juncture

26. Id. at 842.
27. Id. at 843.
28. Id. at 866.
29. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 703 (1995).
30. Id.
31. Eskridge, supra note 3, at 878–79. Others have agreed with Professor Eskridge on this
point. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 238–39 (2006) (concluding that in Sweet Home the Court
“embarked on its own independent construction of the statute, suggesting the correctness of the
[agency’s] broad construction”).
32. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 703 (“[O]ur conclusions that Congress did not
unambiguously manifest its intent to adopt respondents’ view and that the Secretary’s
interpretation is reasonable suffice to decide this case.”); see also Oliver A. Houck, More
Unfinished Stories: Lucas, Atlanta Coalition, and Palila/Sweet Home, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 331,
419 (2004) (noting that “[i]n the end, Chevron would cripple the attack” on the harm rule).
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in his opinion for the Court, Justice Stevens stressed the “reasonableness” or
“permissibility” of the DOI’s interpretation, rather than its exclusivity as a
reading of the ESA.33 I view these moves by Justice Stevens to be more
significant than does Professor Eskridge. The Court’s constant refrain of
“reasonableness” strongly suggests an unwillingness on the Court’s part to
stray far from the commitments of Chevron. The assessment of
“reasonableness” also signals the Court’s recognition that the primary activity
in which the agency was engaged when it promulgated the harm rule was not
“statutory interpretation,” but instead developing a policy within the scope of
the agency’s delegated authority, which in the agency’s judgment, provided
greater protection to endangered species.
Taken at face value, the Court’s reliance on Chevron casts Justices
Stevens’s opinion in a light far different from that suggested by Professor
Eskridge. The majority’s analysis may be understood not as an attempt to
demonstrate that the DOI was uniquely correct in its interpretation, nor an
attempt to remain “blind” to the contrary arguments by Justice Scalia; instead,
Justice Stevens might be making a much more modest point—namely, that
there are sufficient reasons to conclude that Justice Scalia’s interpretation,
which mirrored the interpretation proffered by the rule’s challengers, is not
unambiguously correct. If this is right, Professor Eskridge’s characterization of
Sweet Home as a “hard” case is questionable. Indeed, from a positivist
perspective, Professor Eskridge may be understood as agreeing with Justice
Stevens; his demonstration that Sweet Home is a hard case is based on a
conclusion of statutory ambiguity, and the inevitable need for a “policy”
choice to resolve the dispute between the parties. But this compellingly paves
the way for an appropriate application of Chevron deference. Ironically,
Professor Eskridge, in efforts to demonstrate just how hard Sweet Home was,
makes this an easy case under Chevron.
Moreover, when Professor Eskridge does address the deference question,
he views it not through conventional, positivist Chevron lenses, but through the

33. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 698 (“A reluctance to treat statutory terms as surplusage
supports the reasonableness of [the DOI’s] interpretation.”); id. at 699 (“Congress’ intent to
provide comprehensive protection . . . supports the permissibility of [the DOI’s] ‘harm’
regulation.”); id. at 700 (“Given Congress’ clear expression of the ESA’s broad purpose . . . [the
DOI’s] definition of ‘harm’ is reasonable.”); id. at 701 (“Congress’ addition of the § 10 permit
provision supports [the DOI’s] conclusion . . . .”); id. at 702 (noscitur a sociis canon invoked to
support “permissibility” of the DOI’s rule); id. at 703 (“[W]e owe some degree of deference to
[the DOI’s] reasonable interpretation.”); id. at 704 (“Our conclusion that [the DOI’s] definition of
‘harm’ rests on a permissible construction of the ESA gains further support from the legislative
history . . . .”); id. at 706 (statement in legislative materials did not “undermine[] the
reasonableness of [the DOI’s rule]”); id. at 708 (the DOI’s “broad discretion” makes the Court
“reluctant to substitute our views” for those of DOI). Id. (the DOI “reasonably construed the
intent of Congress . . .”).
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framework of “legal process theory.”34 This is a subtle move, for it maintains
the “hardness” of Sweet Home. On the view advanced by Professor Eskridge,
the relevant inquiry—namely, whether to extend deference to the DOI—
depends on whether the Justices should “trust” the DOI.35 But from a
conventional, doctrinal perspective, a judge’s decision to defer to an agency’s
interpretation is not at all dependent on how much the judge trusts the agency;
under (at least one of) the Court’s current views of Chevron, deference is owed
when there are sufficient reasons to believe that Congress has explicitly or
implicitly invested its trust in the agency “to speak with the force of law.”36
Indeed, the very point of Chevron is to limit the circumstances in which it is
appropriate for judges, when faced with situations in which “law runs out,” to
make a policy choice.37 From this perspective, the absence of any open
discussion among the Justices about green property norms, Blackstonian
norms, or the trustworthiness of the DOI is not a point of criticism; instead, it
is an exemplary and faithful application of the Chevron framework of analysis.
This argument, however, proves too much. Despite the majority’s
conclusion that Chevron provides the appropriate frame for analysis, Justice
Stevens does not explain why that should be so. Justice Scalia’s dissent also
does not address that question, though his curt statement that he “shall assume
that the Court is correct to apply Chevron,”38 perhaps suggests at least some
measure of doubt on the issue. Professor Eskridge, likewise, does not address
that question in terms. Is it self-evident that the rule of Chevron applies in
Sweet Home? The answer, from my perspective, is no, and that is why Sweet
Home is a harder case from a purely conventional perspective.
A.

The Chevron Step Zero Problem

The circumstances in which Chevron’s framework applies—the Chevron
Step Zero problem—are frequently debated in the academic literature, fueled
in part by the Court’s inconsistency in invoking the doctrine.39 From the cases,

34. See Eskridge, supra note 3, at 893–906.
35. See Eskridge, supra note 3, at 905–06.
36. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 219 (2001).
37. See Eskridge, supra note 3, at 882–83; see also Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (concluding
that “[t]he responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of . . . policy choices and resolving the
struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones”).
38. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 715 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
39. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1083 (2008). For a sampling of views on when Chevron should be applied, see Stephen
Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 372–82 (1986);
Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269, 269–70, 277–78 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Judicial
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it is clear that when Step Zero is addressed, the Court is divided on the issue,
with some preferring a categorical approach to Chevron’s application and
others arguing forcefully for a more nuanced, case-by-case inquiry.40 Justice
Scalia tends to view Chevron as more rule-like in scope, applicable whenever
the court is asked to review an agency’s “authoritative” interpretation of a
statute.41 He tends to write separate opinions taking this position whenever the
majority appears to qualify or otherwise restrict the application of Chevron.42
Justice Breyer, by contrast, sees Chevron’s application in much more
contextual terms, concluding that it depends on a variety of case- and statutoryspecific factors.43
The Court has addressed Chevron Step Zero explicitly in a relatively small
number of cases. The most prominent is United States v. Mead Corp.44 There,
the Court held that Chevron applies in two circumstances: when Congress
expressly delegates to an agency the authority to fill a statutory gap or to
elaborate the meaning of statutory terms, or when there is an implicit
delegation of such authority.45 An implicit delegation may be found when it is
“apparent from the agency’s generally conferred authority and other statutory
circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with
the force of law . . . .”46
Two circumstances have often been suggested as good indicators that
Congress did not intend to confer lawmaking authority on an agency, and each
of these might have been invoked by the Court in Sweet Home to deny
Chevron’s application to the DOI’s harm rule. Neither was. The first is
expressed in a number of ways, but it reflects a general proposition suggested
by Justice Breyer in a 1986 law review article. There, Justice Breyer argued
that courts, in determining whether it “makes sense” to infer that Congress
wanted the courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation, should consider the
overall importance of the interpretive issue to the statute’s functioning.47 The

Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 512; Sunstein, supra
note 15, at 207–11.
40. For discussion on this point, see Eskridge & Baer, supra note 39, at 1088–91, 1097–
1136.
41. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the “doctrine of
Chevron” as establishing that “all authoritative agency interpretations of statutes they are charged
with administering deserve deference”); see also Scalia, supra note 39, at 512.
42. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 226 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring).
43. See Breyer, supra note 39, at 373 (concluding that “[t]o read Chevron as laying down a
blanket rule . . . would be seriously overbroad, counterproductive and sometimes senseless.”).
44. 533 U.S. 218, 218 (2001).
45. Id. at 229–30.
46. Id. at 229.
47. Breyer, supra note 39, at 370; see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1004 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Congress may have intended
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theory is that Congress most likely would not hesitate to delegate authority to
an agency to resolve routine, interstitial questions that arise in the ordinary
course of administering a statutory program; indeed, that is what ordinary
administration is all about.48 A healthy respect for the jurisdictional choices
Congress makes, as between administrative and judicial implementation of
regulatory programs, strongly counsels against courts assuming too aggressive
a role in reviewing agency action. In these sorts of cases, the tools of
policymaking and political accountability are much more relevant to effective
resolution of issues than are the traditional tools of legal interpretation, and in
these cases, it is precisely those policymaking tools on which an agency will
rely.
But, a different conclusion might be reached concerning major issues—
such as the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction.49 For these issues, the lines
separating congressional choices about jurisdictional authority as between
agencies and courts are blurred, but pushed in the direction of a stronger
judicial role to adjust the agency’s range of choice. In these cases, the
traditional tools of legal interpretation, rather than the policymaking toolkit,
are more likely to be responsive to congressional choices.50 As Justice Breyer
suggested, for these major issues, it is more likely that Congress would expect
the courts, not an administrative agency, to say what the law is.51

not to leave the matter of a particular interpretation up to the agency . . . where an unusually basic
legal question is at issue.”).
48. Breyer, supra note 39, at 370.
49. For a debate among the Justices about whether questions concerning the scope of an
agency’s jurisdiction are subject to Chevron, compare Mississippi Power & Light Co. v.
Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 381 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that “the rule
of deference applies even to an agency’s interpretation of its own statutory authority or
jurisdiction.”), with id. at 387 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (rejecting idea that deference should be
extended to an agency’s jurisdictional determination because “we cannot presume that Congress
implicitly intended an agency to fill ‘gaps’ in a statute confining the agency’s jurisdiction”). For a
more recent case in which the scope of Chevron is called into question when the statutory
provision at issue is, in a sense, jurisdictional, see AKM LLC v. Secretary of Labor, 675 F.3d
752, 764–69 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Brown, J., concurring).
50. See Foote, supra note 22, at 712–13 (noting that “questions about an agency’s basic
jurisdiction . . . . require resolution by a neutral and independent court using traditional judicial
processes to find fixed meaning in statutory text”).
51. Breyer, supra note 39, at 370. A similar theme is that Chevron deference should be
withheld if the agency interpretation concerns the scope of the agency’s statutory jurisdiction.
See, e.g., N. Ill. Steel Supply Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 294 F.3d 844, 846–47 (7th Cir. 2002)
(holding that the court must conduct de novo review of agency determination of its jurisdiction).
But see City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 248 (5th Cir. 2012) (applying Chevron to
jurisdictional question). Relatedly, some cases suggest that Chevron deference is inappropriate if
the agency’s interpretation involves matters of great “economic and political magnitude.” N.Y.
State Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 276 F. Supp. 2d 110, 126 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000), aff’d sub nom. Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430
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The second circumstance is known as the “avoidance canon.” As
formulated by the Court, deference will be withheld if the agency’s otherwise
acceptable construction of a statute raises serious constitutional problems.52
Again, the theory is that courts should not lightly presume that Congress
intended to permit an agency to press the boundaries of constitutional authority
in the absence of a clear statement to the contrary.53 The thin pillar of statutory
ambiguity is, in these circumstances, an insufficient support for Chevron
deference.
1.

Chevron and “Major Issues”

Both the “major issues” and “avoidance canon” exceptions to Chevron find
support in the Court’s decisions. On the major issues exception, four cases are
particularly instructive: MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC,54 FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,55 Gonzales v. Oregon,56 and
Massachusetts v. EPA.57
In MCI, the Court considered whether the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) could exempt “non-dominant” telecommunications
carriers, like MCI Telecommunications, from the tariff filing requirements of

F.3d 457, 458–59 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). Moreover, the Court has refused to defer to agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes that produce major regulatory effects on the theory that
“‘Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or
ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.’” Gonzales v.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006) (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457,
468 (2001)). For discussion of Chevron’s application in circumstances involving major issues, see
Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 19
(2010); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 15, at 909–14; Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnating the
“Major Questions” Exception to Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (or Why
Massachusetts v. EPA Got it Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 593 (2008); Sunstein, supra note 15, at
234–36.
52. Merrill and Hickman have identified two versions of the avoidance canon. The first,
which they call “the avoidance of unconstitutionality,” provides that given a choice between an
unconstitutional agency interpretation and a constitutional interpretation of a statute, the Court
will select the constitutional one. The second, which they call “the avoidance of questions” canon,
is closer to the one described in this Article. It provides that a court should prefer an interpretation
of a statute that does not raise serious constitutional questions over an agency interpretation that
does raise such questions. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 15, at 914–15. For a fuller
discussion of the difference in avoidance canons, see Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional
Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189 (2006).
53. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 15, at 914.
54. 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
55. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
56. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
57. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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the 1934 Communications Act.58 Tariffs are scheduled rates for services that
are filed with the FCC. They are a key mechanism for ensuring effective
regulatory oversight of carriers’ practices in implementing statutory
requirements that require that rates charged by carriers be nondiscriminatory,
as well as just and reasonable. The FCC had exempted the non-dominant
carriers from tariff requirements in an effort to promote competition in the
long-distance telecommunications market, which had long been dominated by
AT&T.59 The de-tariffing order would enable non-dominant carriers to
compete on price with AT&T in a much more effective and flexible way—by,
for example, permitting the carriers to change their rates without going through
the cumbersome process of filing new tariffs.60 The FCC claimed it had
authority to exempt non-dominant carriers by virtue of its statutory authority to
“modify any requirement” pertaining to common carriers, including the tariff
filing requirement.61
The Court rejected the FCC’s interpretation of the term “modify.”62 In the
Court’s view, the term permits only incremental or moderate changes, not
“radical or fundamental” ones.63 The Court held that deference to the FCC’s
interpretation was not warranted under Chevron because it went “beyond the
meaning that the statute can bear.”64 This conclusion might be viewed as a
straightforward application of Chevron Step One, but the Court suggested a far
different basis for its conclusion, one that resembles the Chevron Step Zero
analysis under Mead: the Court said that “[i]t is highly unlikely that Congress
would leave the determination of whether an industry will be entirely, or even
substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion—and even more unlikely that
it would achieve that through such a subtle device as permission to ‘modify’
rate-filing requirements.”65 Of course, Justice Scalia’s point in making this
statement may be limited to reinforcing his conclusion for the majority that the

58. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 512 U.S. at 220. The tariff requirements are found in section
203(a) of the Communications Act, which provides:
Every common carrier, except connecting carriers, shall, within such reasonable time as
the Commission shall designate, file with the Commission and print and keep open for
public inspection schedules showing all charges . . . , whether such charges are joint or
separate, and showing the classifications, practices, and regulations affecting such
charges . . . .
Id. at 224 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1988)).
59. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 512 U.S. at 220–21.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 225. Section 203(b)(2) of the Communications Act provides: “The Commission
may, in its discretion and for good cause shown, modify any requirement made by or under the
authority of this section . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2).
62. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 512 U.S. at 225–28.
63. Id. at 228–29.
64. Id. at 229.
65. Id. at 231.
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statute is not ambiguous on what the term “modify” means. Nonetheless, it
provides a kind of “common sense” reason for concluding that any ambiguity
that might be drawn from the term “modify” is not the sort of ambiguity that
provides an implicit congressional delegation to the agency to “speak with the
force of law” on whether the tariff requirements should be limited only to
dominant communications carriers.
A similar conclusion was reached in Brown & Williamson, in which the
Court struck down the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) attempt to
regulate cigarettes.66 The agency had concluded that nicotine was a “drug” and
cigarettes were “drug delivery devices” within the meaning of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).67 The agency, relying on those conclusions,
promulgated rules aimed at preventing cigarette manufacturers from marketing
their products to minors.68 The Court rejected the FDA’s plea for deference
under Chevron, concluding that Congress had clearly precluded the agency
from regulating cigarettes.69 As in MCI, the Court phrased its decision as an
application of Chevron’s Step One, but it also cast even stronger doubt on
whether a finding of statutory ambiguity would warrant deference to the
agency’s interpretations of the FDCA.70 The Court said:
Deference under Chevron . . . is premised on the theory that a statute’s
ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill
in the statutory gaps. In extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to
hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit
71
delegation.

Indeed, the Court, analogizing to MCI, concluded that “we are confident that
Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and
political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”72 Under Mead, such
confidence would doom an agency’s plea for Chevron deference.
In Gonzales v. Oregon, the Court considered a challenge to an interpretive
rule issued by the Attorney General under the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA) that would effectively preempt Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act.73 The
Oregon law exempts from criminal and civil liability licensed physicians who,
in compliance with safeguards, administer lethal doses of drugs to terminally
ill patients.74 The Attorney General’s interpretive rule made it a federal crime

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125–26 (2000).
Id. at 127.
Id. at 128–29.
Id. at 159–60.
Id. at 160–61.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 159 (citation omitted).
Id. at 160.
546 U.S. 243, 249 (2006).
Id.
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to administer drugs for this purpose, concluding that this use of drugs is not a
legitimate medical practice.75
The Court held that the Attorney General’s rule was invalid because in
enacting the CSA Congress expressed its “unwillingness to cede medical
judgments to an executive official who lacks medical expertise.”76 The Court,
as in Brown & Williamson and MCI, refused to defer to an agency on issues of
great import without a clear statement of congressional intent to confer such
interpretive authority on the agency.77 But in Gonzales v. Oregon, the Court
was much more explicit than in prior cases on whether Chevron applies in such
circumstances. And, the Court held, it does not.78 “Chevron deference,” the
Court concluded, “is not accorded merely because the statute is ambiguous and
an administrative official is involved. To begin with, the rule must be
promulgated pursuant to authority Congress has delegated to the official.”79
When the administrative official claims “broad and unusual authority” on the
basis of ambiguous statutory language, the delegation must be more than
“implicit”; “‘Congress, we have held, does not alter the fundamental details of
a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one
might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.’”80
A more unusual case is Massachusetts v. EPA.81 The Court’s decision in
that case reinforces the major issues exception to Chevron, but applies it to
deny deference to an agency’s decision to refuse to address major regulatory
issues arising under a statute the agency administers. In Massachusetts, the
Court rejected the EPA’s conclusion that it lacked authority under the Clean
Air Act to regulate greenhouse gases that contribute to global climate change.82
The EPA relied heavily on Brown & Williamson, arguing that regulating
“greenhouse gases would have even greater economic and political
repercussions than regulating tobacco,” and that “climate change was so
important that unless Congress spoke with exacting specificity, it could not
have meant the agency to address it.”83 No matter, the Court concluded—when
Congress has “so carefully and so broadly” empowered an agency with explicit
authority to address significant issues, sometimes with great social, political,
and economic consequences, the agency may not, on the basis of “expedient”
policy reasons, refuse to do so by narrowly (and unreasonably) interpreting its

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 253–54.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 267.
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 258.
Id.
Id. at 267 (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
Id. at 534.
Id. at 512.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

A HARDER “HARD CASE”

945

statutory authority.84 In such cases, there is no room for Chevron deference.
The relevant “policy” had been selected by Congress, leaving no room for
agency “lawmaking.”
What is striking about Massachusetts is that, on the question of whether
greenhouse gases may be considered “air pollutants” that may be regulated
under the Clean Air Act, the agency’s answer relied almost entirely on
arguments based on techniques of statutory interpretation.85 When the agency
offered policy reasons for refusing to regulate, the Court did not frame the
question as one of “statutory interpretation,” but rather as one requiring inquiry
into whether the agency had offered a “reasoned explanation” for its
decision86—an inquiry demanded by the Clean Air Act’s instruction to courts
to “reverse any [agency] action found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”87 There is thus a hint
in Massachusetts that Chevron is appropriately invoked in cases where an
agency incidentally engages in “statutory interpretation” in the course of
making “law” based on larger policy considerations, but its application may be
questioned when the agency’s action is simply “statutory interpretation.”88
These decisions are suggestive, but hardly decisive, of a Chevron Step One
rule that removes major issues from Chevron’s reach. Some have suggested
that such a rule is really a “nondelegation canon,” providing a workable
alternative to the largely unworkable, constitutionally-based nondelegation
doctrine.89 That doctrine holds that, by virtue of the Constitution’s vesting
clause in Article I, section 1, Congress may not delegate “legislative power” to
an administrative agency (or anyone else, for that matter).90 At the same time,
the Court has stressed that it has “‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess
Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left
to those executing or applying the law.’”91 And indeed, that “almost never”
quip by the Court has become in practice a rather firm “never.”92 As a
consequence, the nondelegation doctrine as a constitutional limit on

84. Id. at 529 n.26.
85. Id. at 511–12.
86. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 534.
87. Id. at 528 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9) (2006)).
88. See Foote, supra note 22, at 717 (“[A]gencies are not surrogates for courts, nor are
courts surrogates for agencies[.]”); Herz, supra note 23, at 190 (“Chevron does not make agency
‘interpretations’ of statutes binding on the courts; it does require judicial acceptance of agency
lawmaking.”).
89. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 244–45; Loshin & Nielson, supra note 51, at 22–23.
90. Loshin & Nielson, supra note 51, at 53–54.
91. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001) (quoting Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
92. Loshin & Nielson, supra note 51, at 55–56.
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congressional authority is moribund.93 For those suggesting that the major
issues exception to Chevron be viewed as a nondelegation canon, the
insistence on a clear statement from Congress to support an agency’s major
regulatory moves provides a “softer,” more targeted, version of the
nondelegation doctrine, effectively becoming a species (concern about the
entrusting agencies with major issues) mimicking another species—i.e., the
avoidance canon.94
The problem with this explanation of the major issues exception is that it
ignores the “interpretive” aspects of Chevron in favor of a broader set of
normative assumptions about appropriate institutional arrangements. Viewing
the major issues exception as a nondelegation canon treats this carve-out from
Chevron as a normative judgment about the practices that Congress ought to
observe. More specifically, the normative idea may be that only Congress
should make decisions about major issues of public policy because it, unlike
agencies, is directly accountable to the public. Indeed, this very idea—a kind
of democracy-forcing norm of constitutional interpretation—is the primary
justification for the nondelegation doctrine.95
But as an avoidance cannon, even a “soft” one, the major issues exception
to Chevron is anomalous. First, it is not an invitation actually to “interpret”
statutory texts to determine the range of permissible meanings or the scope of
permissible lawmaking on the part of the agency; it can, instead, function as a
device for rejecting otherwise reasonable policy decisions. Second, as
Massachusetts illustrates, Congress frequently does delegate major policy
issues to administrative agencies, and this practice has long been accepted as
constitutionally appropriate.96 Accordingly, there is no “serious constitutional
question” raised with such delegations, and thus no “avoidance” needed to
invoke a narrowing interpretive device. Moreover, it is doubtful that Congress
itself views such a soft norm as an appropriate way to allocate jurisdictional
authority as between the agencies and the courts. Indeed, at this stage in our
political and constitutional history, it is probably best to simply reject the
normative premises of the nondelegation doctrine and any softer norms that
may emanate from those premises.97

93. See id. at 57.
94. For an example in which the non-delegation doctrine is explicitly linked to the avoidance
canon, see Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S.
607, 646 (1980).
95. See id. at 685 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (non-delegation doctrine “ensures to the extent
consistent with orderly governmental administration that important choices of social policy are
made by Congress, the branch of our Government most responsive to the popular will”).
96. See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 475 (upholding delegation to EPA under the Clean Air
Act to “set[] air standards that affect the entire national economy”).
97. For views that the non-delegation doctrine is anomalous, and not constitutionally-based,
see Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive
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Finally, the normative notion that decisions by Congress are more likely to
be responsive to the public than those of administrative agencies is not
obviously correct, at least in circumstances involving the administration of
regulatory programs, as Chevron itself hints. Agencies, the Chevron court
explained, armed with expertise and experience, may be in a “better position”
than Congress to accommodate “manifestly competing interests,” and in doing
so may “properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise
policy.”98 Such reliance carries with it a democratic pedigree of its own:
“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive
is . . . .”99
A more satisfying explanation for the major issues exception to Chevron
links up more clearly with the interpretive task to which Chevron itself is
committed. In particular, the major issues exception need not be based on
notions of what Congress ought to do, but on what Congress actually does.100
In other words, the major issues exception is simply an interpretive tool based
on descriptive aspects of actual congressional legislative practices, and for that
reason, provides insights on what a chosen statutory term is likely to have
meant or not meant to the Congress that enacted it into law. The point is, as a
general matter, Congress does not generally expect an agency to “speak with
the force of law” on major issues, unless rather explicitly directed by statute to
do so.101 Accordingly, the major issues exception to Chevron may simply be a
useful way to explain that statutory ambiguity comes in several varieties, and

Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097 (2004); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002). On why the doctrine is inconsistent
with current norms, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make
Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985). For opposing views, see THEODORE J. LOWI,
THE END OF LIBERALISM 154–55, 297–99 (2d ed.1979); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original
Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327 (2002).
98. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
99. Id.
100. Loshin and Nielson seem to take issue with this descriptive statement, arguing that
Congress does, at times, “hide[] elephants in mouseholes, or at least tries to.” Loshin & Nielson,
supra note 51, at 49; see also id. at 49–52 (disputing notion that Congress does not intend to
make major policy decisions through ambiguous or minor clauses in statutes). I do not doubt that
Loshin and Nielson are correct on this point, but the pertinent question is not whether Congress
legislates in this way, but rather the frequency of such legislation. After all, the “implicit
delegation” theory of Chevron is a presumption based on a generalization about what Congress
might expect from an agency, not a statement of universal application. Similarly, the “major
issues” exception to Chevron might be viewed as a counter-presumption, based on the general
practices of Congress, not specific pieces of legislation.
101. Elizabeth Foote suggests a more explicit link between the major issues exception to
Chevron and actual congressional choices. She ties “[t]he practice of carving out an exclusion
from Chevron’s rules of deference for so called ‘major questions’” to choices made by Congress
in the federal Administrative Procedure Act’s scope of review provisions. See Foote, supra note
22, at 717.
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while some varieties support a broad rule of deference to agencies, others do
not.102 It is, thus, an interpretive aid, not a normative statement of how power
should be allocated as between courts and agencies.
It matters not that this interpretive aid is a “legal fiction.” Nor is it
significant that the fiction may be supported by normative commitments of one
sort or another. Instead, what matters from an interpretive perspective is
whether the fiction credibly bears a close enough resemblance to actual
practice to support choices that judges make when confronted with demands to
determine, in particular contexts, what an ambiguous statute “means.”103 I
daresay that a common experience of those who deal with complex, agencyadministered regulatory programs is that Congress is not reluctant to trust
agencies with major issues, but is usually pretty clear in expressing its decision
to do so. For that reason, when such clarity is lacking, the anti-Chevron major
issues canon meets up with the kind of “common sense” the Court relied on in
Brown & Williamson.
2.

The Avoidance Canon

The avoidance canon is more clearly established in the Court’s decisions
than is the major issues exception to Chevron, though its scope is subject to
considerable variation from case to case. One of the cases most frequently
cited in support of the avoidance canon’s displacement of Chevron is Edward
J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades
Council.104 In that case, a mall owner filed a complaint with the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB), arguing that a union’s distribution of handbills to
mall customers violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).105 The
union handbills urged customers to boycott the mall because of labor practices
of a firm hired to construct a store in the mall, even though neither the mall
owner nor its tenants had any right to influence the store’s selection of
contractors.106 The NLRB concluded that the handbilling violated a provision
in the NLRA making it unlawful for any union “to threaten, coerce, or restrain”
any person from doing business with other persons.107
The Supreme Court reversed the NLRB’s decision. While the Court
acknowledged that the NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA would “normally
be entitled to [Chevron] deference,” it concluded that “[a]nother rule of

102. See Herz, supra note 23, at 204–07 (discussing types of ambiguity).
103. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation,
97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2050 (2011).
104. 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
105. Id. at 571–72.
106. Id. at 570.
107. Id. at 571–73.
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statutory construction is . . . pertinent here.”108 That rule is the avoidance
canon: “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise
serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid
such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress.”109 Concerned that the NLRB’s interpretation of “coercion” might
stifle protected speech under the First Amendment, the Court concluded that
the NLRA is “open to a construction that obviates” the need to address the
constitutional question.110 Accordingly, it refused to defer to the NLRB’s
otherwise reasonable interpretation of the NLRA.
The avoidance canon is not without controversy. For example, just how
“serious” must a constitutional question be before it may undercut a court’s
willingness to defer to otherwise reasonable agency interpretations of the
statutes they administer? Indeed, the Court’s modern deployment of the
avoidance canon raises difficult issues in which conflicting norms of judicial
restraint—those counseling avoidance of constitutional issues and those
indulging great deference to congressional judgments—battle for
prominence.111 The fundamental concern in such circumstances is that if the
avoidance canon is applied too broadly, the Court may unnecessarily limit
congressional power and/or an agency’s ability to implement a statute in an
effective and appropriate (and constitutional) way.112
B.

Chevron Step Zero and Sweet Home

In Sweet Home, the Court had little hesitation in concluding that Chevron
deference was appropriately extended to the DOI’s harm rule, though it did
reach that conclusion in a curious way. Rather than proceeding according to
the two-step analysis dictated by Chevron, the Court never said whether
Congress had spoken directly to the issue—i.e., it never really performed a
Chevron Step One analysis. Instead, the Court stated: “We need not decide
whether the statutory definition of ‘take’ compels [the DOI’s] interpretation of
‘harm,’ because our conclusions that Congress did not unambiguously
manifest its intent to adopt [the challengers’] view and that [the DOI’s]
interpretation is reasonable suffice to decide this case.”113 Moreover, after
deciding that Chevron applied, the Court stated as a consequence that it owed
“some . . . deference” to the DOI’s interpretation.114 The notion of extending
“some . . . deference”—and its implicit suggestion that there are degrees of

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 574–75.
Edward J. DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 575.
Id. at 578.
See Morrison, supra note 52, at 1202–03.
See id. at 1206–07.
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 703 (1995).
Id.
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deference under Chevron—seems at odds with the more singular and stronger
form of deference articulated in Chevron itself. Despite these variations on
Chevron, the Court rather clearly stopped short of saying that the DOI’s harm
rule was “hard-wired” into the ESA.
Was the Court’s application of Chevron warranted or appropriate? Or was
this a case in which, under either the major issues exception or the avoidance
canon, the Court was obligated to determine for itself what the term “harm”
means? The answer depends, of course, on whether the DOI’s harm rule
amounts to a major issue and/or whether it extends regulatory power
dangerously close to constitutional limits. The answers to these questions, in
turn, depend on one’s understanding of what the regulatory effects of the harm
rule actually are.
1.

What Does the “Harm” Rule Do?

The “harm” rule promulgated by the DOI seems straightforward enough.
Its initial version seemed to be a rather modest step toward securing greater
protection from predation for endangered species. It provided that the term
“harm,” which is included in the ESA’s definition of “take,”115
means an act or omission which actually injures or kills wildlife, including acts
which annoy it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt essential behavioral
patterns, which include, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding, or sheltering;
significant environmental modification or degradation which has such effects
116
is included within the meaning of ‘harm[] . . . .’

The preamble to the rule devoted a scant four paragraphs to the harm rule,
none of which suggested a significant departure from pre-existing law.117
Moreover, the circumstances surrounding its adoption tended to reinforce the
notion that it was not a very significant change to the regulatory program, but
rather a simple gap-filler designed to deal with rather uncontroversial
applications of the take prohibition. For example, few would doubt that a
person “takes” an endangered species of fish when that person drains a pond
that is the only remaining habitat for the species.
There also seems to have been little thought on the agency’s part that the
rule would provoke controversy. The initial rule was included in a package of
proposals, the primary focus of which was removing endangered or threatened
status classifications for the American alligator.118 The relative significance of
the regulation, even from the perspective of its authors, was summed up by
Professor Houck: “At the time (1975) few people—including the [Fish and
115.
116.
1975).
117.
118.

16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2006).
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 40 Fed. Reg. 44,412, 44,416 (Sept. 26,
See id. at 44,413.
See id. at 44,412.
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Wildlife Service, which was the agency within the DOI responsible for the
rule]—realized the implications of what had been done, and even those who
did could not predict what the courts would do with it.”119
The 1981 revision to the harm rule—which the agency described as
clarifying that “habitat modification alone without any attendant death or
injury of the protected wildlife” does not constitute a “take”120—brought the
significance of the harm rule into greater relief.121 While the actual revision to
the rule turned out to be insignificant,122 the target of the revision was not. The
proposed rule would have eliminated habitat modification from the definition
of “harm” entirely, replacing the 1975 rule with one that simply provided that
“harm” “means an act or omission which injures or kills wildlife.” The
rulemaking was largely devoted to an effort to undo, for regulatory purposes,
the decision in Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural
Resources123—a case that, as we shall see, applied the harm rule in an
intuitively appealing, but not obvious way. A memo accompanying the 1981
proposed rule described the case as “erroneously support[ing] the view that
habitat modifications alone may constitute ‘harm.’”124 This result, the memo
concluded, “exceeds the statutory authority conferred by Section 9 of the
Act.”125 Ultimately, however, due to an outpouring of opposition to the
proposed changes, the rulemaking retained the 1975’s inclusion of habitat
modification, simply making clear that when the 1975 rule said “harm”
required a showing of “actual injury or death,” it meant it.126
If the 1981 amendments to the harm rule were meant to limit the decision
in Palila, they failed. Later litigation involving the same parties reaffirmed the
initial decision, and arguably, expanded it to provide even greater protection
for endangered species from the effects of habitat modification.127 Indeed, the
Palila cases provide a peek through an opening door at the potential breadth
and significance of the regulatory structure created by the harm rule.

119. Houck, supra note 32, at 411.
120. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Redefinition of “Harm,” 46 Fed.
Reg. 54,748, 54,748 (Nov. 4, 1981) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17.3).
121. For discussion of the rulemaking, see Houck, supra note 32, at 415–16.
122. Professor Houck concludes that the 1981 rule change “was almost no change at all.” Id.
at 416.
123. 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), aff’d, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
124. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Redefinition of “Harm”, 46
Fed. Reg. 29,490, 29,492 (June 2, 1981) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17.3) (Memorandum of
Assoc. Solicitor, Conservation & Wildlife, J. Roy Spradley, Jr. to Dir., Fish and Wildlife Serv.).
125. Id.
126. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Redefinition of “Harm,” 46 Fed.
Reg. 54,748, 54,750 (Nov. 4, 1981) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17.3).
127. See Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land and Natural Res., 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1077, 1082 (D.
Haw. 1986), aff’d, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
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In the first Palila iteration, the Sierra Club claimed that the Hawaii
Department of Land and Natural Resources was violating the take prohibition
by maintaining populations of feral goats and sheep in an area designated as
critical habitat for the endangered Palila, a six-inch long finch-billed member
of the Hawaiian Honeycreeper family of birds.128 Invoking the citizen’s suit
provision of the ESA, the Sierra Club sought declaratory and injunctive relief
requiring the state agency to remove the offending populations of grazing
animals. Relying on the harm rule, the claim was straightforward: the grazing
animals were destroying the last remaining habitat of the Palila, impairing the
species’ prospects and threatening extinction.129 This clearly “harmed” the
species. Nonetheless, the case raised a number of significant questions,
including (1) whether and under what circumstances the ESA authorizes
actions seeking prospective injunctive relief against threatened “takes”; (2)
whether the harm rule requires proof that injury to, or the death of, an
individual member of an endangered species is imminently threatened by the
defendant’s conduct, or whether longer-term effects on an endangered
population are sufficient; (3) whether the take prohibition requires a
demonstration that the defendant’s conduct is the proximate cause of an actual
or potential taking; and (4) whether defendant’s conduct must be intentional.130
The district court did not explicitly address any of these issues, concluding
simply that the “acts and omissions of defendants” were “clearly within these
definitions” of “take” as elaborated in the harm rule.131
The initial Palila case also raised questions about whether a state’s
exercise of regulatory authority may be challenged as a “take”—a question
with Tenth and Eleventh Amendment implications—and whether a broad
interpretation of the ESA may outstrip Congress’s constitutionally-conferred
legislative authority.132 In Palila I, the district court addressed these issues,
rejecting constitutional challenges to the harm rule.133 These constitutional
issues were not addressed on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Instead, the court of
appeals, in a brief opinion, simply concluded that “[t]he defendants’ action in
maintaining feral sheep and goats in the critical habitat is a violation of the Act
since it was shown that the Palila was endangered by the activity.”134

128. Palila, 471 F. Supp. at 987.
129. Id. at 987–88.
130. For a discussion of these and other issues raised by the ESA’s prohibition on takings, see
Paul Boudreaux, Understanding “Take” in the Endangered Species Act, 34 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 733
(2002).
131. Palila, 471 F. Supp. at 995.
132. Id. at 995–96.
133. Id. at 992–99.
134. Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land & Natural Res., 639 F.2d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 1981).
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The Palila litigation resumed when the endangered bird’s habitat became
threatened by another grazing species, mouflon sheep.135 In this iteration of the
litigation, the district court rejected the state’s contentions that the 1981
amendments to the harm rule required proof of actual injury to a member of
the endangered species, or at the least, a demonstration that the affected
population had declined as a result of the challenged habitat modification.136
Instead, the court held that a “take” is established upon proof that the
defendant’s activity, modifying the habitat, “prevents the [endangered]
population from recovering.”137 In the court’s view, such habitat modification
constitutes an “injury” sufficient to support a finding that a prohibited “take”
has occurred.138 This view of the harm rule comes very close to equating the
take prohibition in section 9 with the “jeopardy” prohibitions and “critical
habitat” protections of section 7, but those provisions apply only to actions of
the federal government, not private parties.139 The Ninth Circuit affirmed on
the more limited rationale that the finding of a “take” was supported by proof
of habitat destruction that threatens extinction, declining to address whether the
harm rule embraces habitat modification that retards a species’ recovery.140
The Palila litigation and other cases provoked great concern among
property owners, developers, and state and local government officials. In their
view, these cases equated harm with habitat modification that merely increased
risk to specific, identified populations of endangered species or, more broadly,
to populations that biologists predicted were likely to use the modified
habitat.141 But this was wrong: “As far as they were concerned, take should
never have been extended beyond its historical meaning, and if habitat
modification had to be the standard, at least [those alleging a “take” under the
harm rule] ought to prove that the habitat modification had actually killed or
injured some identifiable animal.”142 But if Palila raised concern among these
potentially affected entities, more fundamental, and still broader, implications
of the harm rule would ignite a large-scale political backlash. By the early
1990s, it was becoming increasingly clear that the rule had the potential to

135. Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land & Natural Res., 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1071 (D. Haw. 1986),
aff’d, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
136. Id. at 1075.
137. Id. at 1077.
138. Id.
139. See Albert Gidari, The Endangered Species Act: The Impact of Section 9 on Private
Landowners, 24 ENVTL. L. 419, 464–80 (1994) (discussing Palila litigation and the changes it
spurred).
140. Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land & Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 1988).
141. James R. Rasband, Priority, Probability, and Proximate Cause: Lessons from Tort Law
About Imposing ESA Responsibility for Wildlife Harm on Water Users and Other Joint Habitat
Modifiers, 33 ENVTL. L. 595, 603 (2003).
142. Id. at 604.
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transform an apparently simple statutory prohibition, enforced on a case-bycase basis, into a far-reaching regulatory program.143
As written, the ESA has been described as having a “differentness” from
most other environmental statutes: “the ESA imposed no regulatory
prohibitions of any obvious command-and-control scope and weight, did not
employ a cooperative federalism structure to enlist state involvement, erected
no extensive enforcement mechanisms, had no statutorily defined geographic
domain, and was drafted in generalized policy terms, not detailed regulatory
script.”144 But the harm rule proved to be “the lynchpin” in the ESA’s
transformation from such “differentness”—one that supported a few isolated
and episodic interventions on a “one creek, one spring, one cave” basis—“into
a statute of immense regulatory power and geographic reach”145 rivaling (or
exceeding) that of environmental statutes more clearly recognized as
“regulatory,” such as the Clean Air Act146 and Clean Water Act.147
This transformation was gaining steam at the time Sweet Home was
decided. Under the leadership of Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, not to
mention growing citizen activism, a number of complex policies and practices
were taking shape. The opening wedge for this transformation, as Professor
Ruhl has demonstrated, was the agency’s commitment to “ecosystem
management” coupled with a plan for “effective conservation of endangered
and threatened species and fairness to people through innovative, cooperative,
and comprehensive approaches.’”148 Recognizing that the fate of an increasing
number of endangered species was intimately connected with a growing and
largely unaddressed sweeping loss of biodiversity through habitat
modification, the agency began to place much greater emphasis on the statute’s
objective “to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered
species and threatened species depend may be conserved . . . .”149
A key component of the emerging comprehensive approach to species
protection through ecosystem management relied on an invigorated section

143. For a discussion of the significance of the Palila cases, see Robert D. Thornton,
Searching for Consensus and Predictability: Habitat Conservation Planning Under the
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 21 ENVTL. L. 605, 610–14 (1991).
144. J.B. Ruhl, The Endangered Species Act’s Fall From Grace in the Supreme Court, 36
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 487, 518 (2012) [hereinafter Ruhl, Fall From Grace].
145. Id. at 521, 518 (internal citations omitted).
146. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (2006).
147. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (2006).
148. J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress? An Agenda for Administrative Reform of the
Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 367, 373 (1998) [hereinafter Ruhl, Who Needs
Congress] (quoting U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, PROTECTING
AMERICA’S LIVING HERITAGE: A FAIR, COOPERATIVE AND SCIENTIFICALLY SOUND APPROACH
TO IMPROVING THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 1 (1995)).
149. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
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10(a) permit program. Section 10(a) of the ESA authorizes the agency to
permit, “under such terms and conditions [the agency] shall prescribe . . . any
taking otherwise prohibited [by section 9] if such taking is incidental to, and
not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.”150 The
permit program supported the development and implementation of “habitat
conservation plans,” or “HCPs,”151 on private lands—a move critically
dependent on the “regulatory leverage” provided by the harm rule.152
The section 10 permitting authority was conferred on the agency by
amendments to the ESA in 1982, but the HCP program did not become a
significant tool until the early 1990s. Indeed, as of January 1991, only five
section 10 permits including HCPs had been approved by the agency.153
Nonetheless, the sweeping potential of the harm rule, coupled with the section
10 permitting program became clear even years before Sweet Home arrived at
the Court. Some regional offices of the Fish and Wildlife Service interpreted
the Palila case series and other court decisions broadly. They confronted local
government officials with claims that development activities permitted under
local authority could expose the officials to civil and criminal liability if a
“take” resulted from those development activities.154 Through such actions, the
150. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
151. Section 10(a)(2) conditions an incidental take permit on the applicant’s submission of a
“conservation plan” that meets specific requirements. See id. § 1539(a)(2). These plans have
become known as “habitat conservation plans.” For an overview, see U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV., Endangered Species Permits, Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs) and Incidental Take
Permits, http://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/permits/hcp/index.html (last updated Oct. 24,
2012). See also Karin P. Sheldon, Habitat Conservation Planning: Addressing the Achilles Heel
of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 279 (1998) (discussing the addition and
purpose of the HCP provisions to the ESA). Shortly after Sweet Home was decided, the Fish and
Wildlife Service released an “Endangered Species Habitat Conservation Planning Handbook”
which integrates aspects of the ecosystems management approach being developed by the agency.
See Ruhl, Who Needs Congress, supra note 148, at 382–84. The handbook is online at
http://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/permits/hcp/hcphandbook.html.
152. Ruhl, Fall From Grace, supra note 144, at 521.
153. Thornton, supra note 143, at 626.
154. See id. at 613. Professor Thornton provides an example of a letter sent to local officials
by the Fish and Wildlife Service:
Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 . . . makes it unlawful for any person to
take an endangered species without a permit . . . . Section 11 of the Act prescribes civil
penalties of up to $10,000 . . . or imprisonment for up to one year, or both, for knowingly
violating any provision of the Endangered Species Act . . . .
. . . [W]e must advise you, unless you first secure a section 10(a) permit authorizing the
incidental take . . . the approval and implementation of the proposed action may
subject . . . city officials to investigation by our law enforcement branch regarding
potential violations of the Endangered Species Act.
Id. at 613–14 (quoting Letter from Gail Kobetich, Field Supervisor, Sacramento FWS, to Peter
Chamberlin, Sand City Planning Dir. (Nov. 28, 1986)); see also Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 60 (1997) (“[T]he ESA’s ban on adverse habitat
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agency was able to enlist the institutional support of state and local regulatory
programs in its efforts to protect species and their habitats.155 Over time, a
substantial number of “regional” HCPs were put in place, some covering large
metropolitan areas.156 These HCPs allowed local governments and states to
avoid confrontations with the ESA through “megapermits.”157 These efforts
were designed to “induce landowners and local officials to protect blocks of
remaining habitat and corridors for multiple species while in turn releasing
other areas needed for development.”158 Thus, with the participation of state
and local governments, a sort of “cooperative federalism” program regulating
local, private land use on a broad scale was born from a simple change in the
definition of a statutory term and a somewhat ambiguous grant of authority to
issue “incidental take” permits.159 As William Pedersen puts it, though
“loosely reflected in the statutory language,” the section 10 authority for
incidental take permits has been coupled with “the statutory takings bar [to
provide] a bargaining entitlement tradable for actions that the government
could not otherwise command.”160 The growth of HCPs in the early and mid1990s was dramatic.161 By 1995, the agency reported that it had recently
completed incidental take permits with HCPs that involved “relatively large
planning areas (30,000 to 380,000 acres).”162 Moreover, some of the HCPs

modification gives the government a powerful club to hold over the heads of would-be developers
and local officials[.]”). For an example of such official “vicarious” liability for a taking, see
Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 163 (1st Cir. 1997) (“[A] governmental third party pursuant to
whose authority an actor directly exacts a taking of an endangered species may be deemed to
have violated the provisions of the ESA.”), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 978 (1998).
155. See, e.g., Thornton, supra note 143, at 614 (providing example where the Fish and
Wildlife Service sent warnings of a potential ESA violation to county officials in Riverside,
California, after which appropriate permits were obtained by the county).
156. See Ruhl, Who Needs Congress, supra note 148, at 382 (“One of the most sweeping
movements in ESA administrative policy is [the agency’s] promotion of habitat conservation
planning processes under section 10(a)(1) of the ESA, particularly at regional scales.”).
157. Ruhl, Fall From Grace, supra note 144, at 520.
158. John F. Turner & Jason C. Rylander, The Private Lands Challenge: Integrating
Biodiversity Conservation and Private Property, in PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT 92, 100 (Jason F. Shogren ed., 1998).
159. Ruhl, Fall From Grace, supra note 144, at 520. For a more comprehensive discussion of
how the ESA’s take prohibition has evolved from a strict prohibition to support a broadened
regulatory program with forms of cooperative federalism, see Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative
Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 207–29 (2005).
160. William F. Pedersen, Using Federal Environmental Regulations to Bargain for Private
Land Use Control, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 35 (2004).
161. See Ruhl, Who Needs Congress, supra note 148, at 382 n.58 (“From 1983 through 1992,
only 14 HCP permits were issued; whereas by the end of January 1997 over 210 HCP permits had
been issued and about 200 HCPs were under development.”).
162. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR REPORT TO CONGRESS:
RECOVERY PROGRAM, ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES 23 (1994).
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leveraged the harm rule to achieve broader environmental objectives, such as
watershed quality goals in areas prone to increased sedimentation in streams as
a result of economic and development activities.163 In 1996, the DOI was
considering twenty-five proposed HCPs that would apply to areas in excess of
100,000 acres; an additional eighteen HCPs under development by the agency
would apply to areas in excess of 500,000 acres.164 Clearly, by the time Sweet
Home reached the Court, “the ESA was about far more than stopping a . . .
project here and there—the ‘one creek’ had gone viral, the ESA had gone
nationwide, and the regulatory burden had gone private.”165
Moreover, at the time of decision in Sweet Home, a number of complex
policies, initiated under the leadership of Secretary of the Interior Bruce
Babbitt, were beginning to take shape. Included among them were “safe
harbor” and “no surprises” rules that were intended to induce private actors to
participate in habitat conservation efforts by reducing some of the more severe
regulatory consequences of the harm rule and its impact on property rights.166
The rules also directly addressed some of the perverse incentives and
unintended consequences of the harm rule. Without regulatory safe harbors,
potentially affected private parties may act to reduce the risk that economic

163. John F. Turner & Jason C. Rylander, Conserving Endangered Species on Private Lands,
32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 571, 578 (1997).
164. Sheldon, supra note 151, at 301. In 1996, Albert Lin reported that “HCPs range in form
from a set of conservation measures to be taken by a small lot owner to a comprehensive regional
land management plan, and have been approved for land areas ranging from less than one acre to
several hundred thousand acres.” Albert C. Lin, Participants’ Experiences with Habitat
Conservation Plans and Suggestions for Streamlining the Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 369, 372
(1996) (citing U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., STATUS OF HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS (Sept.
30, 1995)).
165. Ruhl, Fall From Grace, supra note 144, at 519.
166. The “safe harbors” policy was officially announced in 1997. Announcement of Draft
Safe Harbor Policy, 62 Fed. Reg. 32,178, 32,178 (June 12, 1997). The policy was, however,
incorporated in HCPs as early as early 1995. News Release, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., U.S.
Dep’t of the Interior, Woodpeckers, Private Landowners Share Homes Under New “Safe Harbor”
Conservation Plan (Mar. 1, 1995), http://www.fws.gov/news/historic/1995/19950301.pdf.
According to this news release, Secretary Babbitt cited the “flexibility of the current Endangered
Species Act,” as a way to “offer[] private landowners an incentive to be good stewards of their
land and provide habitat for endangered and threatened species,” while offering an “ironclad
guarantee that they will not be subject to restrictions later on if they succeed in attracting
endangered species to their land.” Id. The “no surprises” policy was first announced with the
release of the Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting
Process in 1996. 61 Fed. Reg. 63,854 (Dec. 2, 1996). The policy provided that “under no
circumstances, including extraordinary circumstances, shall an HCP permittee who is abiding by
the terms of their HCP be required to provide a greater financial commitment or accept additional
land use restrictions on property available for economic use or development.” Id. at 63,857. The
policy was sustained in Spirit of the Sage Council v. Kempthorne, 511 F. Supp. 2d 31, 44 (D.D.C.
2007).
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and development activities may be halted by choosing to “shoot, shovel, and
shut up,” eliminating protected species from their properties or destroying
habitats of species that may be listed in the future.167 The new policies
provided assurances to property owners that their cooperation in protecting
valuable habitats would neither expose them to unexpected liabilities nor
escalating restrictions on the use of their property, so long as plans to mitigate
risks to endangered wildlife were observed. Aware of the potential breadth of
regulation associated with the harm rule, the agency began to consider other
ways to minimize its impact. For example, the DOI proposed a rule that would
“creat[e] a new set of presumptions which would exempt certain small
landowners and categories of small-scale or negligible-impact activities from
possible incidental take liability for threatened species.”168 The actual effect of
this exemption might be small; it would apply only to threatened, not
endangered, species.169 For endangered species, the agency simply lacks
statutory authority to provide such exemptions.170 Nonetheless, it sent a signal
to landowners that the agency was willing to moderate the sometimes severe
effects of the harm rule on pre-existing property rights.
2.

Sweet Home and Closeting

By any measure, at the time of Sweet Home, the harm rule was a “major
issue” in the implementation of the ESA and fundamentally altered the scope
of the DOI’s regulatory authority. Yet, even a close reading of Justice Stevens’
opinion in Sweet Home provides few hints of the rule’s dramatic effects. To be
sure, the Court acknowledged in closing that “the Act encompasses a vast

167. Lin, supra note 164, at 382. The phrase “shoot, shovel, and shut up,” as Professor
Eskridge notes, traces to Chuck Cushman, Executive Director of the American Land Rights
Association. Eskridge, supra note 3, at 902–03 (citing Mark Sagoff, Muddle or Muddle Through?
Takings Jurisprudence Meets the Endangered Species Act, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 826
(1997)). For discussion of the “perverse incentives” associated with strict ESA enforcement, see
Jonathan H. Adler, Back to the Future of Conservation: Changing Perceptions of Property Rights
& Environmental Protection, 1 N.Y.U.J.L. & LIBERTY 987, 1006–09 (2005); Amara Brook et al.,
Landowners’ Responses to an Endangered Species Act Listing and Implications for Encouraging
Conservation, 17 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1638 (2003).
168. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Rule Exempting Certain
Small Landowners and Low-Impact Activities from Endangered Species Act Requirements for
Threatened Species, 60 Fed. Reg. 37,419, 37,420 (proposed Jul. 20, 1995) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 17).
169. Id. at 37,419.
170. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress, supra note 148, at 395–96 (“FWS is authorized to fashion
exemptions only for threatened species because these species do not automatically receive the
take prohibition extended to endangered species. Moreover, since no authority for deviating from
the take prohibition and incidental take permitting structure of the statute exists, FWS can not
extend the exemption to listed endangered species.”).
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range of economic and social enterprises and endeavors,”171 but there is little
else in the opinion that alerts the reader to the importance of the issue under
consideration. In fact, in the few instances in which the potential application of
the harm rule is discussed, its reach seems to be descriptively minimized by the
Court, effectively closeting significant legal issues from view.
For example, the Court evokes the “one creek” view of the ESA when it
describes the consequences of striking down the harm rule, noting that the
agency would be powerless to respond “when an actor knows that an activity,
such as draining a pond, would actually result in the extinction of a listed
species by destroying its habitat.”172 But the Court neither mentions nor
considers the larger ramifications of the rule, which was increasingly used to
leverage the development of HCPs encompassing large geographic areas and
multiple species. Similarly, the Court discusses only criminal and civil
enforcement of the rule’s prohibition, entirely ignoring its deployment in
support of large-scale, agency-centered regulatory initiatives.173
Indeed, the Court, in contrasting the take prohibition with other provisions
of the ESA, provided a deceptively narrow description of the ways in which
the harm rule may be deployed by the agency. It said that, unlike the
government’s ability to protect endangered species through habitat purchases
under section 5 of the ESA, “the Government cannot enforce the [take]
prohibition until an animal has actually been killed or injured.”174 The
assertion has proven to be both incorrect and incomplete. It is incorrect
because, as post-Sweet Home cases confirm, a plaintiff may seek to enjoin
conduct that is expected to result in an imminent “take” of an endangered
species.175 It is incomplete because it ignores that it is “citizen suit litigation,

171. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995).
172. Id. at 699–700.
173. See id. at 702.
174. Id. at 703.
175. See Marbled Murrelet v. Pac. Lumber Co., 83 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 1996) (“A
reasonably certain threat of imminent harm to a protected species is sufficient for the issuance of
an injunction under section 9 of the ESA.”). The burden that a private party or the government
must shoulder in support of a claim for injunctive relief for a prospective “take” of endangered
species remains a controversial issue before the courts. Compare the results in Marbled Murrelet
with the First Circuit’s decision in American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163, 166 (1st Cir. 1993)
(“[C]ourts have granted injunctive relief only where petitioners have shown that the alleged
activity has actually harmed the species or if continued will actually, as opposed to potentially,
cause harm to the species.”). The proof that a take will occur also serves as a predicate for the
issuance of an incidental take statement or permit. See Ariz. Cattle Growers Ass’n. v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d 1229, 1242 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A]bsent rare circumstances such as those
involving migratory species, it is arbitrary and capricious to issue an Incidental Take Statement
when the Fish and Wildlife Service has no rational basis to conclude that a take will occur
incident to the otherwise lawful activity.”). For discussion of the burden of proof question, see
Boudreaux, supra note 130, at 750–56; James R. Rasband, supra note 141, at 608–18.
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not governmental action, that forms the bulk of suits for injunctive relief under
the ESA.”176 As Paul Boudreaux notes, “[t]he teeth of the [take prohibition] are
found in its empowerment of plaintiffs to enjoin conduct before it occurs,”
which “places within the target of plaintiffs all private economic activity that
disturbs the environment and threatens protected species.”177 Even more
significantly, this statement closets the combined effect of the harm rule and
the agency’s section 10 permitting authority and the potentially vast regulatory
scope of the emerging HCP policies.
It is not as if the Court was not informed about the agency’s activities
under the harm rule. The extensive briefing in the case highlighted the vast
scope, sometimes severe consequences, and perverse incentives associated
with the implementation of the rule.178 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit, in striking
down the rule, cited the large-scale implications of the rule as a basis for
suggesting an “improbable relation to congressional intent”179—a veritable
plea for applying the major issues exception to the rule of Chevron deference.
In like fashion, the Court’s opinion offers no suggestion that the broad
sweep of the harm rule might raise serious constitutional issues, perhaps issues
serious enough to support invocation of the avoidance canon. The singular
reference to an issue of potential constitutional significance in the opinion is a
footnote in which the Court rejected a plea for applying the rule of lenity in
support of a narrow interpretation of the ESA.180
Like the major issues themes, the absence of any discussion of possible
constitutional objections to the harm rule cannot be explained on the simple
ground that none were raised in briefs before the Court. Arizona’s brief noted

176. Boudreaux, supra note 130, at 751 n.101.
177. Id. at 750.
178. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Pac. Legal Found., et al. in Support of Respondents at *1,
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (No. 94-859),
1994 U.S. Briefs 859, 1995 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 226 (“[The] ‘harm’ regulation as applied in
this state forbids most types of otherwise permissible, ordinary land use activities on millions of
acres of private land.”); Brief Amicus Curiae of Mountain States Legal Found., et al. in Support
of Respondents at *19, Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687 (No. 94-859), 1994 U.S. Briefs 859, 1995 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 234 (“[T]he ‘harm’ regulation has become a bureaucratically-minted tool for
the federal land use management of private property.”); Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Texas in
Support of Affirmance at *6, Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687 (No. 94-859), 1994 U.S. Briefs 859,
1995 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 191 (“Using the overexpansive ‘harm’ regulation, the FWS
has . . . seized control over land use planning throughout large sections of the state from Texas
and its local governments.”); Brief of the Inst. of Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at *37–*38, Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687 (No. 94-859), 1994 U.S. Briefs 859, 1995
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 229 (arguing that the incentive effects of the rule will lead to greater
habitat destruction).
179. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463, 1465 (D.C. Cir.
1994), rev’d 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
180. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 704 n.18.
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that “[s]ignificant questions exist as to whether the federal government has
authority under the United States Constitution to” regulate private uses of
land.181 Invoking the Tenth Amendment, the State also argued:
Considering the long history of congressional deference to states in the
management of nonfederal lands and natural resources, which is reiterated in
the act, it is inconceivable that Congress would so radically alter that policy by
the use of a single word in a section of the Act that does not even mention
182
habitat modification.

Similarly, Texas’s brief directly addressed the applicability of the avoidance
canon and Chevron. The State argued that deference under Chevron was
“inappropriate because the challenged agency regulation intrudes into areas of
constitutionally-protected state authority without a plain statement from
Congress.”183
What is most striking about the Court’s silence on potential constitutional
objections to the harm rule is that within ten days of oral argument in Sweet
Home, the Court handed down its decision in United States v. Lopez.184 The
dramatic decision in Lopez spawned serious questions about just how far the
Court was willing to go in ending its decades-long acquiescence in expansive
exercises by Congress of that institution’s constitutional authority to regulate
commerce among the several states. And, of course, it is the commerce power
that provides the constitutional warrant for Congress’s enactment of the
ESA.185 In Lopez, the Court concluded that the Gun Free School Zones Act
exceeded the limits of the commerce power, principally because it was “a
criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort
of economic enterprise.”186 The Court also expressed considerable concern that
the legislation placed a national footprint in an area “where States historically
have been sovereign.”187
And what of the section 9 take prohibition in the ESA, as implemented by
the harm rule? Could it not plausibly be described in precisely the same terms
as the legislation struck down in Lopez? Undoubtedly, many, if not most,
instances of “habitat modification” can easily be described as “economic
activity,” but the harm rule does not specifically target such activities, nor by
its terms is the rule limited to such instances.188 Moreover, the Court had
181. Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Arizona et al. in Support of Respondents at *30, Sweet
Home, 515 U.S. 687 (No. 94-859), 1994 U.S. Briefs 859, 1995 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 178.
182. Id. at *39.
183. Brief for State of Texas, supra note 178, at *4.
184. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
185. See 40 Fed. Reg. 44,412.
186. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
187. Id. at 564.
188. See Karkkainen, supra note 154, at 78 n.430 (“I am prohibited from destroying the
habitat of a nesting pair of bald eagles whether I do it for the commercial purpose of building a
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recently emphasized that land use regulation—the primary target of the harm
rule—is “a function traditionally performed by local governments.”189 While,
as we shall see, the ESA has been able to withstand constitutional challenges
under the commerce clause, is it not fairly obvious that the harm rule at the
least raises a “serious constitutional question” that might warrant invocation of
the avoidance rule? And if so, what explains the Court’s silence on the
question, particularly given the release of the Lopez decision?
The puzzlement becomes greater when one considers the Court’s later
decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC).190 In that case, the Court refused to
extend Chevron deference to an agency rule defining the geographic scope of
the Clean Water Act.191 The rule in question defined “waters of the United
States” to include “waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including
intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes,
wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction
of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce . . . .”192 The Corps of
Engineers had interpreted this regulation to confer jurisdiction on the agency
over intrastate waters that served as habitat for migratory birds or endangered
species—an interpretation that became known as the Migratory Bird Rule.193
In SWANCC, the Corps relied on the rule to assert jurisdiction over an
“isolated water”—an abandoned gravel mining site that had, through natural
processes, become scattered with permanent and seasonal ponds of varying
sizes and depths.194 The waters within the site were found to provide habitat
for over 120 species of migratory birds.195 Having established its jurisdiction,
the Corps demanded that a regional solid waste management agency, which
planned to use the site as a landfill, secure a Clean Water Act permit before
placing any fill material in the protected waters.196 The agency’s permit
application was ultimately denied by the Corps, which found that the solid
waste agency’s activities would have a variety of undesirable environmental
effects.197
On review of the agency’s action, the Court held that the Migratory Bird
Rule exceeded the Corps’ authority under the Clean Water Act. While the

shopping center, or for the noncommercial use I plan to make of the land for my own aesthetic
enjoyment.”).
189. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994).
190. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
191. Id. at 172.
192. Id. at 163 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3)(1999)).
193. Id. at 164 (citing 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217).
194. Id. at 162–63.
195. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164.
196. Id. at 163–64.
197. Id. at 165.
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Court found the statute to be “clear” in denying the Corps such authority, it
held that even if it concluded otherwise, it would not have extended Chevron
deference to the Corps’ action.198 The Court said, “Where an administrative
interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power, we
expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result.”199 Noting its
concern to avoid constitutional issues, and an “assumption that Congress does
not casually authorize administrative agencies . . . to push the limit of
congressional authority,” the Court added that this concern is “heightened
where the administrative interpretation alters the federal-state framework by
permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state power.”200
Invoking Lopez, the Court expressed doubt about whether the Migratory
Bird Rule could be characterized as regulating activities that are “plainly of a
commercial nature,” noting that this characterization was a “far cry, indeed,
from the . . . ‘waters of the United States’ to which the statute by its terms
extends.”201 Furthermore, the rule “would result in a significant impingement
of the States’ traditional and primary power over land and water use,” altering
“the federal-state balance” in derogation of the statute’s stated purpose to
“‘recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of
States . . . to plan the development and use . . . of land and water resources
. . . .’”202
The parallels between the regulation struck down in SWANCC and the
harm rule at issue in Sweet Home are striking. Both directly impact state and
local governments’ “traditional and primary power over land and water use.”203
And whether, as a criminal prohibition, the take prohibition addresses
“economic” or “commercial” activity is a difficult question to resolve, and
depends to some extent on the very same sort of characterization problems
noted in SWANCC.
In the wake of Lopez, several challenges to the harm rule under the
commerce clause were initiated, all of which were obviously regarded by the
respective reviewing courts as raising serious constitutional questions. For
example, in National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, a three-judge panel of
the D.C. Circuit divided three ways, with one dissent, in upholding the harm
rule as applied to development activities that would “take” by habitat
modification members of the endangered Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly
population.204 Echoing the “characterization” problem alluded to in SWANCC,

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 172.
Id.
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172–73.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 174 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)).
Id. at 174.
130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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none of the judges could agree on precisely what the relevant “regulated
activity” was that might be said to “substantially affect interstate
commerce.”205
When the issue came before the same court again in 2003, the problem
persisted. In Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, the court held that the “precise
activity that is regulated in this case . . . is Rancho Viejo’s planned commercial
development, not the arroyo toad that it threatens.”206 Chief Judge Ginsburg
filed a concurring opinion, stressing that it was the “large-scale residential
development” that was the relevant regulated activity.207 He concluded it is
“[j]ust as important, however, [that] the lone hiker in the woods, or the
homeowner who moves dirt in order to landscape his property, though he takes
the toad, does not affect interstate commerce.”208 Dissenting from the denial of
a petition for rehearing en banc, two judges in the circuit took issue with this
characterization of the regulated activity. Judge Sentelle, adhering to the view
expressed in National Home Builders, insisted the regulated activity was the
“taking” of a “purely local toad” and that that activity “does not have any
substantial relationship to interstate commerce.”209 Likewise, then-judge, now
Chief Justice Roberts objected that it was not the development that should be
considered, but whether prohibiting “the taking of a hapless toad that, for
reasons of its own, lives its entire life in California constitutes regulating
‘Commerce [] among the several States.’”210
Other courts of appeals have also struggled with commerce clause
challenges to the ESA’s harm rule. In Gibbs v. Babbitt, a divided Fourth
Circuit panel upheld a rule extending the take prohibition to an experimental
population of wolves that had been reintroduced into North Carolina and
Tennessee.211 Judge Luttig filed a spirited dissent, concluding,
[W]e are confronted here with an administrative agency regulation of an
activity that implicates but a handful of animals, if even that, in one small

205. See id. at 1054 (Wald, J., plurality opinion) (describing the regulated activity as the
“‘taking’ of endangered animals”); id. at 1059 (Henderson, J., concurring) (“Insofar as
application of section 9(a)(1) of ESA here acts to regulate commercial development of the land
inhabited by the endangered species,” it is within the commerce power); id. at 1065 (Sentelle, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that “[t]here is no showing . . . that a reduction or even complete
destruction of the viability of the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly will in fact” affect interstate
commerce). For a discussion of the problem of identifying the “regulated activity” for purposes of
commerce clause analysis, see John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi
Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174, 208–14 (1998).
206. 323 F.3d 1062, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
207. Id. at 1080 (Ginsburg, C.J., concurring).
208. Id.
209. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1158–59 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Sentelle, J.,
dissenting).
210. Id. at 1160 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
211. 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., 531 U.S. 1145 (2001).
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region of one state. An activity that not only has no current economic
character, but one that concededly has had no economic character for well over
a century now. An activity that has no foreseeable economic character at all,
212
except upon the baldest . . . of speculation . . . .

Similarly, in GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton, the Fifth Circuit
sustained a commerce clause attack on the ESA’s taking prohibition as applied
to six species of invertebrate cave species found only in two counties in
Texas.213 Six circuit judges dissented from the denial of a petition for rehearing
en banc. Writing for the dissenters, Judge Jones argued that the panel’s
decision “crafted a constitutionally limitless theory of federal protection. Their
opinion lends new meaning to the term reductio ad absurdum.”214 In the
dissenters’ view, “there is no link . . . between Cave Species takes and any sort
of commerce . . . .”215 The constitutionality of the ESA’s take prohibition under
the commerce clause has also generated a substantial scholarly literature.216
Prima facie, then, Sweet Home presented a strong case for applying either
the major issues or avoidance canon exceptions to Chevron. Yet, nowhere in
the Court’s opinion is there even the slightest hint that the application of
Chevron might be problematic. In the next Part, I offer some suggestions in
support of the Court’s decision and defend the application of Chevron in Sweet
Home.
II. CHEVRON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-MAKING, AND CONGRESSIONAL
DELEGATION
What may explain the Court’s reluctance to consider directly whether, due
to the great significance of, or to the serious constitutional issues raised by, the
harm rule, Chevron might properly be invoked? Part of the explanation may lie
in conventional doctrinal terms. The Court reminded us that the challenge to
the rule was a “facial challenge,” requiring the Court to consider only whether
the regulation would be inconsistent with the ESA in all of its possible
applications.217 Surely, there are at least some applications of the harm rule

212. Id. at 508–09 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
213. 326 F.3d 622, 624 (5th Cir. 2003), rehearing en banc denied, 362 F.3d 286 (5th Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005).
214. GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton, 362 F.3d 286, 287 (5th Cir. 2004) (denial of
rehearing en banc) (Jones, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 291.
216. For a sampling, see Michael C. Blumm & George Kimbrell, Flies, Spiders, Toads,
Wolves, and the Constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act’s Take Provision, 34 ENVTL. L.
309 (2004); Bradford C. Mank, Protecting Intrastate Threatened Species: Does the Endangered
Species Act Encroach on Traditional State Authority and Exceed the Outer Limits of the
Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REV. 723 (2002); Nagle, supra note 206.
217. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 699–700
(1995).
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that would be considered a “take,” even by Justice Scalia’s more demanding
interpretation of the term, and just as surely, some of these undoubted “takes”
would clearly have a “significant effect” on interstate commerce so as to
survive a challenge under the commerce clause. Under the terms of the “facial
challenge,” the more controversial and expansive applications of the harm rule
could legitimately be ignored by the Court. For the more uncontroversial
applications of the rule, the agency’s action would appear more in the nature of
an “interstitial,” gap-filling exercise of delegated authority that does not push
the boundaries of constitutional authority.
This explanation, while reasonable, is not entirely satisfying. And, indeed,
as we shall see, the Court itself does not completely honor it. A careful review
of the various opinions in Sweet Home makes clear that the question of
whether “habitat modification” may “harm” an endangered or threatened
animal, and thus, constitute a “take,” was largely a red herring. Given the 1982
amendments to the ESA, and the supporting legislative history, there can be
little question that any attempt by the DOI to completely exclude habitat
modification on private lands from the scope of the ESA’s protections for
endangered and threatened wildlife would be treated as inconsistent with the
agency’s statutory responsibilities. In this sense, the harm rule, or perhaps a
more limited version of it, was “hard-wired” into the ESA. But this was not the
target of those who challenged the harm rule in Sweet Home. Instead, the
critical issue in the case, and one on which the challengers of the rule focused
their energy, was the rule’s application to “private land use activities indirectly
affecting listed wildlife, but in no respect directed at wildlife or directly
injuring specific animals.”218 In other words, the critical question was just how
broadly the implementing agency might (or might continue to) apply a rather
ambiguous agency regulation.
Consider, first, Justice Scalia’s dissent. He objected that the harm rule “has
three features which . . . do not comport with the statute,”219 but importantly,
none of his “three features” targeted the simple inclusion of “habitat
modification” as means of “harming” protected animals.220 Instead, Justice
Scalia first found objectionable that the rule prohibits “habitat modification
that is no more than the cause-in-fact of death or injury to wildlife.”221 The
second objectionable feature for the Justice was that the rule “does not require
an ‘act,’” because it “covers omissions.”222 Finally, and “most important,”
Justice Scalia found that the rule “encompasses injury inflicted, not only upon

218.
13051.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Brief for Respondents at *8, Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (No. 94-859), 1995 WL
Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 715 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 716.
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individual animals, but upon populations of the protected species.”223 While
Justice Scalia focused his attack on the rule, it seems that a better description
of his target of attack was the harm regulation as interpreted in the Palila
cases. Indeed, the regulation itself does not explicitly adopt any of the
“objectionable” features upon which Justice Scalia relied to conclude that the
rule lacked supporting authorization in the ESA.
The Court majority may have responded to Justice Scalia’s arguments by
treating them simply as potential applications or interpretations of the rule that
can, and should, be ignored when considering a facial attack. But it did not.
Instead, the Court replied that the dissent had simply read the rule too broadly.
With no mention of Chevron, (or better yet, Seminole Rock224) the Court stated
that “we do not agree with the dissent that the regulation covers results that are
not ‘even foreseeable . . . no matter how long the chain of causality between
modification and injury.’”225 Instead, the Court noted, the rule incorporates
“ordinary requirements of proximate causation and foreseeability” that limit
the scope of its application.226 Likewise, the Court noted that the terms of the
rule “obviously require” a demonstration of “‘but for’ causation” and actual
injury or death to a protected species.227 While not going quite as far as Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence, these observations certainly cast some doubt on the
continuing viability of the Palila cases, which Justice O’Connor declared to be
“wrongly decided.”228 To be sure, the Court equivocated a bit, noting that “[i]n
the elaboration an enforcement of the ESA, the Secretary . . . will confront
difficult questions of proximity and degree[,]” suggesting some room for
continuing agency discretion regarding the scope of the regulation.229 And it
was this equivocation that likely explains Justice Scalia’s dissent.
The Court’s conclusions have proven to have some significant effects on
the scope of the harm rule. Professor Rasband notes that “the post-Sweet Home
case law appears to be taking a narrower view of when habitat modification

223. Id.
224. The Seminole Rock doctrine holds that an agency’s interpretation of its regulation will be
upheld by the courts “unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
225. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 696 n.9.
226. Id. at 700 n.13. The Court also suggested that Justice Scalia misinterpreted the rule in
claiming that it does not require proof of injury to particular animals. It noted that “every term in
the regulation’s definition of ‘harm’ is subservient to the phrase ‘an act which actually kills or
injures wildlife.’” Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 714 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor also interpreted the harm rule to
“require[] demonstrable effect (i.e., actual injury or death) on actual, individual members of the
protected species.” Id. at 711.
229. Id. at 708 (Stevens, J., majority opinion).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

968

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:931

will be considered the proximate cause of harm to a protected species.”230
Professor Ruhl is less equivocal in his assessment of the effects of the Court’s
foray into issues of causation and effect; he describes the decision as one that
“substantially undercuts the take prohibition” and as a “stunning blow to the
statute’s vitality.”231 Even those who challenged the rule, and lost, claimed
something of a victory from the Court’s decision, concluding that Sweet Home
“narrowly construed” the harm regulation.232
The Court’s brief peek into, and consideration of, possible applications of
the rule were, indeed, responsive to the challengers’ primary concerns about
the harm rule, but they also underscore the intensely factual and policy-driven
nature of the issues surrounding the rule. The Court’s brief discussion also
tends to reflect the relative infrequency of prior litigation over the rule from
which clear agency policy choices could be gleaned. Indeed, at the time of
decision there were few reported cases involving government prosecutions for
criminal or civil penalties for violations of the rule.233 Much of the “law”
governing the harm rule remained, and still remains, to be made.
In these circumstances, the Court’s invocation of Chevron and its refusal to
say that the ESA either prohibited or compelled the agency to treat habitat
modification as a “take” seem appropriate. To be sure, the closeted major
issues and avoidance canon exceptions to Chevron might have, and could have,
supported a different approach, but their application in Sweet Home was not
clearly warranted. Indeed, the restraint exercised by the Court in Sweet Home
underscores precisely why this was a harder “hard” case. In Sweet Home, the
Court confronted the limits of Chevron and the possibility that in Chevron, it
had made a serious category mistake.
The Chevron doctrine was born out of a long-standing, and sometimes
strident, dispute between various interest groups about how the Clean Air Act
should be implemented in areas that were failing to attain air quality standards.
These disputes were, in turn, part of a larger debate on the effectiveness and

230. Rasband, supra note 141, at 618; see also Federico Cheever & Michael Balster, The
Take Prohibition in Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act: Contradictions, Ugly Ducklings,
and Conservation of Species, 34 ENVTL. L. 363, 366 (2004) (“nine years after Sweet Home, the
federal courts have yet to put jurisprudential flesh on the statutory bones of the section 9 take
prohibition. Issues regarding burden of proof have remained stalled at a rudimentary level.”);
Houck, supra note 32, at 425–26 (discussing the pro-environmentalist leveraging power that
exists as an effect of Sweet Home).
231. Ruhl, Fall From Grace, supra note 144, at 502.
232. Steven P. Quarles et al., Sweet Home and the Narrowing of Wildlife “Take” Under
Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10003, 10017 (1996). The authors of
this article represented the respondents in Sweet Home.
233. See id. at 10005.
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wisdom of federally enforced “command and control” regulation.234 Some
maintained that strict, inflexible emissions limitations on sources were needed
to protect public health and welfare, and that “new” sources should be subject
to especially strict, state of the art pollution controls.235 Others argued that such
an approach was too costly and inhibited capital investment in “dirty air” areas
or in newer, cleaner plant and equipment, effectively extending the lives of
older, dirtier sources and contributing to persistent air quality problems.236 The
latter, “unintended consequences” of strict pollution controls were particularly
acute for sources in so-called nonattainment areas. Any “modification” of such
a source that caused an “increase” in air pollutants would legally convert the
existing source into a “new” source, subjecting it to expensive and timeconsuming permitting procedures and stringent, technology-based emission
limitations.
Faced with these contending arguments, and eager to implement a new
administration’s commitment to reducing the burdens of federal regulation, the
Environmental Protection Agency promulgated the so-called “bubble” rule.237
In essence, the rule permitted regulated entities to aggregate all of the various
air pollutant emitting equipment together on a plant-wide basis and to treat the
aggregated emissions as emanating from a single source, encasing the entire
plant as if it were within a “bubble.”238 If one piece of equipment within the
bubble was modified in a way that increased pollution from baseline levels for
that equipment, that increase could be offset by reducing emissions from any
other emission point within the bubble.239 If the offset kept total emissions
within the bubble at, or better yet, below pre-modification levels, the timeconsuming permit procedures and stringent emissions controls could be
avoided because there would be no increase in total emissions.240 For the EPA,
the vehicle for achieving this significant policy innovation was to redefine the
term “stationary source” to include “all of the pollutant-emitting activities
which belong to the same industrial grouping, are located on one or more
contiguous or adjacent properties, and are under the control of the same
person.”241

234. Richard B. Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (1985).
235. Id. at 2–3.
236. See, e.g., Laurens H. Rhinelander, The Bubble Concept: A Pragmatic Approach to
Regulation Under the Clear Air Act, 1 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 177, 224 (1981).
237. See, e.g., Foote, supra note 22, at 680.
238. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 44 Fed.
Reg. 3,274, 3,276 (Jan. 16, 1979) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51).
239. Id. at 3,277.
240. Id.
241. 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.18(j)(1)(i)–(ii) (1983).
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The redefinition of the term “stationary source” was not driven, of course,
by an exercise of “statutory interpretation,” though the agency did offer “legal”
reasons in support of its action.242 Rather, the rule was a complex policy choice
that the agency, consistent with the views of the existing administration,
believed could best meet its obligations under delegated statutory authority. It
was, in other words, the product of a process “of bureaucratic implementation
to meet administrative goals.”243 The rule did not answer all questions that
would likely arise in its application—for example, what does “adjacent” or
“contiguous” mean? So there remained a considerable amount of interstitial
and complex lawmaking to be done as the agency went about its
responsibilities. But when challenged, the question posed to the Court was not
whether the agency’s choice was a reasonable one, given the complex policy
options available to the agency.244 Instead, the question was posed as whether
the agency had correctly “interpreted” the Clean Air Act’s statutory
language.245
And the Court in Chevron bought that characterization of the issue,
positing the issue as one involving review of “an agency’s construction of the
statute which it administers.”246 Ultimately, however, the Court affirmed the
agency’s action on grounds that had little to do with interpretation and a lot
more to do with sound administrative governance. The Court held that the
agency’s action “represent[ed] a reasonable accommodation of manifestly
competing interests and is entitled to deference: the regulatory scheme is
technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and
reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies.”247
This is precisely the sort of judgment courts had been making when reviewing
agency action under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard codified by the
Administrative Procedure Act.248 In promulgating the new “source” rule, the
agency was not engaged in a process of “statutory interpretation;” it was,
instead, engaged in a process of lawmaking.249
The Court’s conclusion in Chevron is, moreover, like the Administrative
Procedure Act itself, predicated in large measure on the choices Congress
evidently made in the statutory scheme about how the respective jurisdictions

242. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans;
Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 16,280, 16,281 (Mar. 12,
1981) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51 and 52).
243. Foote, supra note 22, at 685.
244. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840, 845 (1984).
245. Id. at 840.
246. Id. at 842.
247. Id. at 865 (internal citations omitted).
248. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413–14 (1971)
(discussing arbitrary and capricious standard).
249. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66.
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of the courts and agency should be allocated and defined. In Chevron, the
Court acknowledged that in some cases the courts must “reconcile competing
political interests,” but when Congress has delegated to an agency the authority
to implement a statutory program, “federal judges . . . have a duty to respect
the legitimate choices made by” the agency.250
Turning to Sweet Home, we can now readily see the poverty in casting the
issue before the Court as one of reviewing an agency’s exercise of “statutory
interpretation.” To be sure, the question whether a “taking” could be effected
through “habitat modification” is a question that implicates the scope of the
agency’s statutory authority. But at the time of decision, the agency was faced
not with demands about how the statute should be interpreted, but rather with
conflicting demands about just how aggressively the harm rule should be
implemented. And, as we have seen, it was precisely this issue that
commanded the Court’s attention. Yet, the answer to that question was at the
time open to considerable doubt. The agency faced a serious policy challenge.
In the face of Palila and like decisions, and limited resources, the agency knew
that it needed to provide assurances to potentially regulated parties that their
responsibilities under the ESA would not place unreasonable demands upon
them or unnecessarily restrict the uses that could be made of their property or
the scope of their economic activities. Without such assurances, the agency
understood that the incentive structure of the existing state of affairs might
dramatically increase the incidence of “shoot, shovel, and shut up” behavior,
with the resulting loss of valuable habitat and biodiversity that regulated
parties might otherwise be willing to protect.
The agency was just beginning to respond to these policy challenges at the
time of Sweet Home. The harm rule, coupled with the agency’s section 10
incidental take permitting authority and its “safe harbor” and “no surprises”
initiatives, provided the agency with leverage to bring interested parties into a
conversation about how the “technical and complex” regulatory program might
be molded in ways such that “manifestly competing interests” might be
reconciled.251 This intensively policy-driven process of lawmaking had little to
do with “statutory interpretation” and a lot more to do with law-making. As in
Chevron, the Court concluded that the agency should be permitted to engage
such a process, so long as it proceeded in a “reasonable” manner. This is an
eminently defensible, and appropriate, application of Chevron, even if Chevron
itself may be faulted for failing to distinguish between acts of interpretation
and acts of policymaking.

250. Id.
251. Id. at 865.
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CONCLUSION
In an influential essay published nearly three decades ago, Robert Cover
spoke of an imagined world of “jurisgenerative” processes in which
“communities of mutually committed individuals,” sometimes “split over
major issues of interpretation,” “create law and . . . give meaning to law
through their narratives and precepts, their somewhat distinct nomos.”252 He
recognized that in the “real” world, the jurisgenerative process “takes place in
the shadow of violence.”253 The agents of such violence may be varied, but
courts are sometimes assigned a “special role” in effecting such violence:
“Courts, at least the courts of the state, are characteristically ‘jurispathic.’”254
His insight is that, in many circumstances, the “origin of and justification for a
court is . . . understood to suppress law, to choose between two or more laws,
to impose upon laws a hierarchy.”255 In this fashion, “the agency of state law
shuts down the creative hermeneutic of principle that is spread throughout our
communities.”256 These jurispathic actions may sometimes be necessary to
curtail open conflict, and potential violence, among competing private factions.
But Professor Cover openly questioned just how “jurispathic” courts must be
to ensure that the minimum conditions for communal living are satisfied. He
ended his essay with the claim that “[l]egal meaning is a challenging
enrichment of social life, a potential restraint on arbitrary power.”257 To
support a broad range of “legal meaning,” and ongoing jurisgenerative
processes, Professor Cover made a plea to the courts “to stop circumscribing
the nomos; we ought to invite new worlds.”258
The abstraction of Professor Cover’s notions of “jurisgenerative” processes
that enlarge and enrich the “nomos” may seem far afield from the problem
presented in Sweet Home. But a moment’s reflection may reveal some
important parallels. In Sweet Home, we can, and properly should, view the
position of the challengers and of Justice Scalia as one enlisting the Court’s
authority to violently shut down the lawmaking (jurisgenerative) processes in
which the agency was then engaged. We may similarly view any decision by
the Court that the harm rule was “hard-wired” into the ESA as an act
authorizing the agency to violently suppress the conflicting “law” under which
those opposed to the rule were committed. But there is a third possibility, and
Chevron provides it: it authorizes the agency to engage these conflicting
“laws,” reconcile them, and create a “new world.” The Court was right to resist

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Cover, supra note 24, at 40.
Id. at 50 n.137.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id. at 44.
Cover, supra note 24, at 68.
Id.
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the demand for more definitive action; better to let Congress’s delegate assess
the “manifestly competing interests,” and use its expertise and accountability
to fashion appropriate reconciling policies. Yes, Sweet Home was a harder
“hard case,” but not, or not only, for the reasons expressed by Professor
Eskridge.
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